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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RAISING THE BAR: BROWN AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY

ANDERS WALKER*

I. INTRODUCTION
When we think of the impact that Brown v. Board of Education1 had on
American history, we tend to think of the role that it played in desegregating
southern public schools, inspiring the civil rights movement, or inciting
massive resistance.2 And yet, Brown had other consequences as well, some of
which registered not on the terrain of education or civil rights, or even massive
resistance per se, but rather on the structure of the southern political apparatus.
This Article will examine the intersection between Brown and a central
component of that apparatus, the southern judiciary, including both the
southern bar and the courts. Two states, South Carolina, a traditionally
conservative Deep South state, and North Carolina, a traditionally moderate
and progressive state, will be used as examples of how Brown catalyzed
innovations in political and, in particular, judicial technology.
In discussing these two states, this Article will seek to broaden
understandings of Brown by looking at the ruling not simply as a fulfillment of
America’s Constitutional promise to African-Americans, but as a destabilizing
influence on the southern legal order. Many white southerners, particularly
lawyers, viewed Brown not as an isolated case, but rather as the culmination of
a series of cases handed down by the Supreme Court during a period of almost
two decades. This trend, many southern lawyers believed, began in 1937 when
the Supreme Court abandoned its laissez-faire stance toward private industry
and endorsed the New Deal, a shift that compromised the autonomy of
southern legal and professional elites, both in terms of economics and civil
rights. In response, southern attorneys, and in particular leaders of the bar,
increased the ethical requirements of legal practice, cleaned up localized and
informal judicial mechanisms, and removed oversight of the southern judicial
* Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Police Science, and Criminal Justice Administration,
John Jay College of Criminal Justice.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. For a recent synopsis of Brown’s impact on these factors, see JAMES T. PATTERSON,
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY
(2001).
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apparatus from the legislature, placing it firmly in the hands of centralized,
state supreme courts.
Many of these strategies bore direct implications for African-Americans.
Perhaps most notable among them were provisions raising the ethical standards
of the practice of law, particularly prohibitions on barratry that sought to
undermine lawyers working for the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP). Other provisions, namely the centralization of
state court systems and the professionalization of the judiciary, attempted in
part to improve the image of the law in black eyes, not to mention the
operation of the law on black bodies. This marked a strategic concession on
the part of southern states, one designed in part to arrest the hemorrhage of
state power to the federal government through civil rights actions, even as it
reduced the fervor of black calls for justice and social change.
These shifts, from the perspective of statecraft, constituted an effort to
control from below a legal system that could not be controlled from above.
Unable to influence the United States Supreme Court, southern lawyers sought
instead to discipline their own ranks, to improve the quality of their judges, and
to eliminate vagaries in the southern judicial process. This not only bolstered
the image of the law in the South, but complicated the degree to which the law
could be used as a modality for furthering subaltern agendas like civil rights.
As the federal judiciary took increasing liberties with state law, southern
lawyers took fewer liberties with the way in which they allowed that law to be
practiced.
They also placed less faith in the autonomous, and often arbitrary, power
of localized, county elites. Throughout much of southern history, state politics
had been dominated by rural elites, often headquartered in heavily black
plantation counties.3 These elites resisted change, hampered industrialization,
and insisted on maintaining strict levels of localized discipline and control over
African-Americans. This was often marked by lapses in attention to the
constitutional rights of black people, not to mention abuses of judicial
authority in general.
Following Brown, attempts to reign in rural counties intensified, in part
through attempts to clean up the southern judiciary. Although these shifts bore
direct implications for African-Americans, they extended beyond the struggle
against integration into questions of industrialization, state autonomy, and the
evolution of the southern legal apparatus. It is important to note here that up
until the 1960s, the South was largely a region not only of de jure segregation,
but also of localized, idiosyncratic judicial mechanisms that, like Jim Crow,
represented archaic, Nineteenth Century legal technologies. Brown, in
addition to sounding the death knell of the color line, intensified southern

3. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS (1949).
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efforts to modernize these technologies, and in particular to centralize,
professionalize, and unify its judicial machinery.
The role of African-Americans in catalyzing this process was a critical
one. After all, the vast majority of civil rights cases leading up to Brown,
which southern lawyers viewed correctly as a threat to their power, were
argued by black lawyers. Not surprisingly, southern states attempted to
undermine these lawyers, even as they sought to make good on claims that
they did not discriminate against African-Americans. This Article will begin
its analysis of both North and South Carolina with examples of attempts to
undermine black civil rights, using these examples as entry points from which
to analyze larger shifts in the southern legal order.
II. PROFESSIONALIZATION IN THE PALMETTO STATE
Three years before the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Brown,
South Carolina established a special committee to deal with the possibility of
court-ordered desegregation in the state.4 This committee, inspired by the
NAACP’s challenge to segregated schools in Briggs v. Elliott, was officially
named the South Carolina School Committee yet became popularly known as
the Gressette Commission after Marion Gressette, the state legislator who
chaired it.5 Gressette, a lawyer and active member of the State Bar
Association, employed one of South Carolina’s most prominent attorneys, Bar
Association President David W. Robinson, to advise him on legal matters.6
With Robinson’s help, Marion Gressette devised myriad strategies of
circumventing Brown and neutralizing social unrest, many of which revolved
around shifting distributions of power within state government. For example,
one strategy adopted by the Gressette Commission was the centralization of
law enforcement authority around the governor, an idea that Gressette got from
Florida.7 Gressette wrote to David Robinson in January 1957:
I should like the Staff to consider preparing draft of a bill authorizing the
Governor of the State to suspend operation of any public utility whether

4. David W. Robinson, Manuscript, Brown v. Board Revisited, at 9, microformed on David
W. Robinson Papers, Reel 2 (on file with University of South Carolina School of Law, Columbia,
South Carolina) [hereinafter DWR Papers].
5. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 530 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated by 352 U.S. 350 (1952).
For a discussion of Briggs and how it formed one of the five cases that eventually became Brown,
see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 315-66 (1977).
6. David W. Robinson was asked to act as counsel for the Gressette Committee, officially
known as the South Carolina School Committee, in 1955. Memorandum from David W.
Robinson, The South Carolina School Committee (Gressette Committee) (May 3, 1983),
microformed on DWR Papers, supra note 4, at Reel 1.
7. Letter from L. Marion Gressette, to The Honorable David W. Robinson (Jan. 2, 1957),
microformed on DWR Papers, supra note 4, at Reel 2.
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privately owned or not which would be similar to the law enacted by the
General Assembly of the State of Florida. It occurred to me that we should
have such a law in South Carolina for use on the part of the Governor in an
emergency arising from race or other trouble.8

The centralization of state power around the governor proved appealing to
Gressette, in part because it created the opportunity for quick responses to local
unrest, even as it undermined the autonomy of local elites. Local elites,
particularly in heavily black counties like those in South Carolina’s eastern low
country, tended to be more radically racist than less-racialized counties in the
central and western portions of the state.9 This radicalism made them less
concerned with adhering to professional standards of law enforcement, and
more prone to putting down black unrest with a heavy hand, thereby drawing
unwanted federal attention to the state.10
To stem such conflagrations, an all-encompassing provision in the bill
authorized the governor “‘to take such measures and to do all and every act
and thing which he may deem necessary in order to prevent violence or threats
of violence to the person or property of citizens of the state.’”11 Specifically,
“[t]he bill would give the governor power to ‘order any and all law
enforcement officers of the state or any of its subdivisions to do whatever may
be deemed necessary to maintain peace and good order.’”12 Like its antecedent
in Florida, the South Carolina emergency powers act aimed to control whites
as well as blacks. “The Ku Klux Klan,” noted Columbia’s foremost
newspaper, The State, “could be controlled in its meetings by provisions in the
bill which would give the governor authority to issue an emergency
proclamation ‘when in his opinion the facts warrant . . . because of unlawful
assemblage, violence or threats of violence, a danger exists.’”13
As the Gressette Commission sought to centralize power around the
governor to deal with potential unrest, so too did it seek to hamstring the
8. Id. The end result of this was the creation of the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division (SLED), a centrally controlled agency that investigated racial incidents and sought to
neutralize unrest.
9. In his epic study of southern politics, V.O. Key, Jr. describes the geographic breakdown
of racial attitudes in South Carolina, distilling it into a struggle between the Piedmont and the
Low Country. See KEY, supra note 3, at 135-42. This is not to say that racism did not exist in
the Piedmont. See Timothy B. Tyson, Dynamite and “The Silent South”: A Story from the
Second Reconstruction in South Carolina, in JUMPIN’ JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS FROM
CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS 275-97 (Jane Daily et al. eds., 2000).
10. For more on the interrelationship between media coverage and police procedure, see
Anders Walker, The Ghost of Jim Crow: Law, Culture, and the Subversion of Civil Rights, 1954–
1965 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author).
11. Broad Powers on Buses Proposed for Governor, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 1,
1957 (quoting from the segregation committee bill).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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NAACP’s battle in the courts.14 On January 3, 1957, Marion Gressette
announced a joint meeting of the South Carolina School Committee to consider
drafts of segregation bills, one of which called “for the investigation by the
Attorney General of organizations promoting or inducing litigation.”15
Another called for the criminalization of barratry.16
Barratry, an archaic crime dating back to Seventeenth Century England,
referred to the fomenting or stirring up of frivolous lawsuits.17 The NAACP,
white southerners like Gressette correctly believed, actively sought to stir up
cases around which it could build legal campaigns targeting Jim Crow in the
federal courts.18 By authorizing investigations into the NAACP and charging
its attorneys with unethical practices, the Gressette Commission hoped it could
neutralize civil rights litigation in the state.
Marion Gressette later described, somewhat disingenuously, his hope that
the barratry statute might also prevent violence. “Frequently I have colored
people call at my office,” claimed Gressette in 1959, “and they are frank in
saying that they do not go along with the NAACP and other misguided
associations and individuals for integration of the races.”19 According to
Gressette, African-Americans in the state were happy with the idea of
equalizing black facilities, and did not endorse integration.20 Instead of
supporting civil rights, they were “the victims of a system of intimidation and

14. Robinson noted that in South Carolina:
The [Gressette] Committee also served as a sounding board for the many persons in South
Carolina who desired to take violent and unwarranted recourse against this change in our
way of life. The Committee heard everyone who wanted to be heard. It used its influence
with considerable success to persuade people of position and of standing to limit their
opposition to the school decisions to lawful means. It assisted in the preparation of an
interposition resolution in the tradition of Madison and Clay, protesting the soundness of
the Brown decisions but declaring that the State’s opposition would be within not without
the law.
Robinson, supra note 4, at 11.
15. Letter from L. Marion Gressette, Senator, Calhoun County, to Members of the
Committee, Legal Staff and Educational Consultant (Jan. 3, 1957), microformed on DWR Papers,
supra note 4.
16. Id.
17. Barratry became the crime of stirring up litigation in the Seventeenth Century. Before
that, it referred to the purchase or sale of ecclesiastical preferments. See 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
18. For accounts of the NAACP’s legal strategies, see KLUGER, supra note 5, and MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936–1961 (1994).
19. Address of L. Marion Gressette to the State and Local Officers of the Citizens’ Councils
of South Carolina (June 23, 1959) (on file with University of South Carolina, Modern Political
Collection, William D. Workman Papers, Box 20, “Gressette Commission” Folder) [hereinafter
Address of L. Marion Gressette].
20. Id.
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oppression such as even the Dark Ages failed to produce.”21 The ultimate
result of this intimidation, caused by groups like the NAACP, was a
breakdown in good relations between the races. A positive relationship
between black and white, in turn, was instrumental in preventing violence.22
“This relationship should be encouraged,” continued Gressette, “and I am sure
you are conscious of its value and will help to promote it so that the State of
South Carolina can continue to be free and clear of any racial disturbance.”23
Barratry provided one strategy of preventing racial disturbances by
thwarting the NAACP. “In an effort to alleviate” the intimidation of blacks,
Gressette announced that:
[A]n old law has been brought to the front known as the crime of barratry,
which simply means that no person will hereafter be permitted to solicit or
incite another to bring, prosecute or maintain an action at law or at equity, in
any court having jurisdiction within this State. Putting it another way, no
person without or within the State can solicit or prevail upon another person to
bring an action in any Court having jurisdiction in the State of South Carolina.
This will prevent organizations such as the NAACP from promoting lawsuits
and inciting members of the colored race to bring suits for any purpose in the
State of South Carolina. Any corporation or unincorporated association found
guilty of the crime of barratry shall be forever barred from doing any business
or carrying on any activity in this State and shall be subject to a fine of not
more than $5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than two years or both. We
think this law will have a wholesome effect on those who would incite and
foment trouble among the good colored people of the State of South Carolina.
We feel that we owe them this protection and this law will be strictly enforced
in order that they may be protected against our common day carpetbaggers and
scalawags.24

South Carolina was not alone in raising the bar as a means of attacking
modern-day carpetbaggers and scalawags. In fact, Georgia, Mississippi,
Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia all enacted strict barratry provisions as
a means of eliminating NAACP lawyers in the wake of Brown.25 These
provisions, although effective while they lasted, eventually fell under the axe

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Address of L. Marion Gressette, supra note 19, at 9.
25. For a description of these laws, see Race Relations Law Survey, 2 RACE REL. L. REP.
881, 892-94 (1957). Mark Tushnet discusses the resurrection of barratry as a means of resisting
Brown, particularly in Virginia. See TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 272-82. Susan Carle also
discusses the deployment of ethics standards, particularly barratry, against the NAACP. See
Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the NAACP (Part II), 8 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281, 298-307 (2001).
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of Supreme Court review in 1963.26 However, they coincided with more
subtle, systemic changes in the southern legal structure that provide clues into
the role that Brown played in transforming the South’s political apparatus. For
example, Marion Gressette’s resurrection of barratry was not his only attempt
to increase the regulation of lawyers in South Carolina. In fact, he joined a
larger effort mounted by the Gressette Commission’s David W. Robinson and
the South Carolina Bar Association to centralize the regulation of lawyers in
general. Together with Robinson, Gressette served on the South Carolina
Judicial Council, an advisory committee created by the South Carolina Bar that
recommended removing the regulation of lawyers from the legislature, placing
it directly in the hands of the state supreme court.27 This bill, effectively
insulating the bar from the vagaries of the democratic process, gave the court
investigatory powers as well as the authority to enforce increased standards of
professional ethics in the state.28
The state legislature adopted the Council’s recommendations in August
1957 by approving a bill empowering the state supreme court to promulgate
“rules and regulations defining and regulating the practice of law, establishing
rules of professional conduct for attorneys at law, and establishing practice and
procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys at law.”29 The
bill, which removed the regulation of lawyers from the democratic process,
also created boards responsible for screening applicants “for admission to the
Bar and to conduct investigations into reported violations and hold hearings,
under rules to be prescribed by the Supreme Court, in cases involving
discipline, disbarment, suspension, or reinstatement of attorneys.”30
Davis J. Kerr, David W. Robinson’s successor as president of the state bar,
endorsed the new bills under the rubric of improving the image of lawyers and
encouraging respect for the law. The bar, asserted Kerr, “is not looked upon
by the general public with the respect and confidence to which it is entitled.”31
Disrespect for the bar, incidentally, was a problem articulated by lawyers
across the South as an unfortunate symptom of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Brown. Even though southern attorneys had no say in the high court’s
decision, they nevertheless found themselves in the unpleasant situation of
being public agents of the judicial system, and therefore beholden to
maintaining its image in the public eye, even as the Supreme Court besmirched
26. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963). For accounts of the rise and fall of
barratry as a means of undermining the NAACP, see TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 272-82.
27. Legislature Enacts Statute Authorizing Court to Adopt Practice Laws, S.C. BAR ASS’N
NEWS BULLETIN, Aug. 1957, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. President Kerr Sets Out Principal Aims as Bar Association President, S.C. BAR ASS’N
NEWS BULLETIN, Aug. 1957, at 1.
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it. One particularly good example of how this influenced the response of
southern bar associations to Brown emerged in Virginia in 1956, one year
before Kerr endorsed the increased regulations of the bar in South Carolina.
During the annual meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association of that year,
an argument broke out between lawyers regarding whether they should endorse
a resolution proclaiming massive resistance to the Supreme Court.32 Some,
such as Virginia lawyer Alex W. Parker, thought they should.33 Others, such
as Michael D. Wagenheim, the Chair of the Virginia bar’s Committee on
Resolutions, did not, arguing that the language of the resolution was too
severe.34 The resolution asserted that:
The Virginia State Bar Association calls for the lawyers of all States . . . to
rally the citizens to total resistance by all proper means against these threats to
the continued existence of our representative forms of government, and to the
exercise of all available means of stemming this tide of usurpation of
governmental powers by the present Supreme Court.35

The resolution’s mention of a tide of usurpation referred to a widespread
feeling on the part of southern lawyers that Brown was part of a larger trend in
Supreme Court jurisprudence encroaching on southern state law that had begun
in 1937.36 Although many lawyers agreed with this theory, to call for overt
defiance of the Supreme Court struck many Virginia attorneys as selfdefeating. “Your Committee,” asserted Wagenheim, “felt that this language,
as well-meaning as it might be, might be construed by the laymen, by
implication, as an effort on the part of the lawyers to defy the courts and might
lead to the undermining of respect for our entire system of judicial
administration.”37
Intent on upholding respect for the judiciary, lawyers in Virginia voted not
to proclaim overt rebellion against the Supreme Court, just as lawyers in South
Carolina sought to impose increased ethical requirements on themselves. Not
that practicing law in South Carolina suddenly became harder than in most
states in the Union. On the contrary, the American Bar Association had
adopted identical standards in 1908, almost half a century earlier.38 Indeed,

32. Minutes of the Third Day of the 1956 Annual Meeting of the Virginia State Bar
Association, in VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 38-39 (1956), microformed on Reel
9, BA.V57 (on file with University of Virginia School of Law) [hereinafter Minutes of the Third
Day].
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id. at 39-40.
35. Id. at 39.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 49-60.
37. Minutes of the Third Day, supra note 32, at 40.
38. Specifically, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the 47 Canons of Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA) that had been adopted by the ABA in 1908.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

RAISING THE BAR

1045

South Carolina’s sudden interest in raising the bar suggests that it was catching
up to national trends, rather than blazing new trails. In fact, it suggests that
when confronted with social crisis, South Carolina embraced centralization and
formalization, moves alien to a state long known for decentralization, localism,
collegiality, and informal networks.39
South Carolina also embraced a move away from democracy. By taking
the regulatory power of lawyers away from the legislature, it insulated the bar
from popular control. This was particularly significant for the Palmetto State,
in part because it had long been known to exist under what southern historian
V.O. Key, Jr. called “legislative government.”40 This term referred to the
dominance of the South Carolina legislature over both the governor and the
judiciary,41 a position that was willingly compromised during the aftermath of
Brown, not only by shifting power out of the legislature and into the courts, but
also into the State’s executive branch via emergency powers to the governor.
As black equality loomed on the horizon, the role of the state legislature in
governing the legal process and, for that matter, the legal profession, declined.
In its place rose the state bar association and the state supreme court. The state
bar, much like legislative committees in Congress, provided a policy apparatus
for the court, thereby enabling lawyers to determine for themselves how the
justice system would work and who would work it. The state bar also enabled
South Carolina to revamp its judicial apparatus, thereby improving its image in
the public eye. This was particularly important after Brown, given that the
Supreme Court’s ruling undermined not just Jim Crow, but the authority of the
southern legal system in general, an authority that many African-Americans
already held to be dubious at best.
By improving efficiency, increasing professionalism, and raising
standards, the South Carolina bar sought to re-establish the authority of the
state judiciary. This promised to help African-Americans in so far as it
removed many of the vagaries of the judicial process, even as it coincided with
attempts to keep NAACP lawyers out of the state. Not simply a strategy of
resistance, the South Carolina bar’s impact on the judicial apparatus also
represented an act of accommodation—a means of buying black support and
neutralizing black activism. Marion Gressette and David W. Robinson’s work
on South Carolina’s Judicial Council consequently reinforced their work on the
South Carolina School Committee, in part by establishing heightened ethical

Canons of Ethics of American Bar Association Adopted for State, S.C. BAR ASS’N NEWS
BULLETIN, Sept. 1956, at 4.
39. Perhaps tellingly, on May 1, 1957, Charles W. Moore, a state senator and Spartanburg
lawyer, proposed a bill barring out-of-state lawyers from practicing in South Carolina. Bill
Barring Out-of-State Lawyers Offered in Senate, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 2, 1957.
40. See KEY, supra note 3, at 150-55.
41. See id. at 152.
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standards for lawyers in the state.42 The Council, established by the state
Supreme Court pursuant to a motion by the Executive Committee of the State
Bar Association, of which David W. Robinson was president at the time, came
into being on July 21, 1956, at the height of massive resistance to Brown.43
Not surprisingly, one of the standards approved by the Council was the
limitation on barratry, enacted specifically to curtail the NAACP.44 Other
duties assigned to the Council included:
“[C]ontinuous study and survey of the administration of justice in this State,
and of the organization, procedure, practice, rules and methods of
administration and operation of each and all of the Courts of the State, whether
of record or not of record, and of each of all the agencies, boards,
commissions, bodies and officers having and exercising quasi-judicial
functions and powers.”45

Once investigated, the state’s courts, and even quasi-judicial executive and
legislative bodies, would be subjected to increased regulation and reform.
Marion Gressette justified this increased bid for power by the judiciary at a
meeting of state and local officers of the Citizens’ Councils of South Carolina,
a segregationist organization dedicated to fighting Brown.46 “The attitude of
the United States Supreme Court, a long line of decisions which have been
accepted as absolutely binding precedents and the abdication by the Congress
of power held in trust for the people are contributing to our downfall,”
Gressette told Council leaders on June 23, 1959.47 He continued:
In the face of this trend, South Carolina has made its position clear. We are
not defying the “law of the land” we are fighting for a return to the law of the
land. They call us reactionaries and racists, but we are neither. The true
reactionaries are those who would subject the law to the whim of those who
happen to be in power at a given moment.48

Gressette’s words, a cry to remove law from the vagaries of electoral politics,
bolstered his recommendations to remove the control of lawyers from the state
legislature. Further, they coincided with his efforts to increase the role of the

42. The establishment of the Council, as well as its membership list, was published in the
September 1956 edition of the South Carolina Bar Association News Bulletin. See Judicial
Council Established by Supreme Court, S.C. BAR ASS’N NEWS BULLETIN, Sept. 1956, at 1.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
45. Judicial Council Established by Supreme Court, supra note 42, at 1 (quoting July 21,
1956 South Carolina Supreme Court order creating a Judicial Council for South Carolina).
46. For works discussing the centrality of the Citizens’ Councils to massive resistance, see
NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS’ COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1954–64 (1971) and NUMEN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S (1969).
47. Address of L. Marion Gressette, supra note 19, at 2.
48. Id.
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state bar, a private, non-political organization, in controlling the law. At odds
with this mission were not only Brown, but a string of decisions by the United
States Supreme Court.49 Herein lurks a critical yet often missed component of
the Second Reconstruction. White southerners, in particular white southern
lawyers, did not oppose Brown simply because it demanded the integration of
southern public schools, but because it marked yet another step in a larger
encroachment by the Court onto the terrain of state sovereignty. This
encroachment did not begin in 1954 with Brown, or in 1951 with Briggs,50 but
in 1937, with Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.51 That was the message
Senator and former judge Strom Thurmond of South Carolina delivered to the
Virginia State Bar Association in 1955. “As attorneys,” Thurmond told the
Virginia Bar, “you probably know that in the eighteen years since 1937, thirtythree previously formulated principles of constitutional law have been
discarded or overruled by the Supreme Court. In the preceding 137 years of
this nation under the Constitution only twenty-nine previously established
principles were overruled.”52 Thurmond’s mention of 1937 was significant.
That year, the Supreme Court abandoned almost three decades of
decentralized, laissez-faire jurisprudence to endorse sweeping federal
regulations of private industry and the states.53 This shift, which triggered
nothing less than a revolution on the Court, angered many wealthy, white
southerners who resented minimum wage laws and the sudden activist, some
might say even paternalist, emphasis on enforcing government programs and
civil rights.54
Consequently, Thurmond was not alone among white southerners in
framing Brown within the context of the post-1937 jurisprudential shift. In
fact, lawyers throughout the South recognized this. Among them were some of
the most influential figures in massive resistance, men like Tom P. Brady, the
intellectual father of the Citizens’ Councils, and James O. Eastland, head of the
Judiciary Committee in the United States Senate.55 In 1954, one year before
Thurmond addressed the Virginia Bar, Eastland lamented:

49. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (giving Congress broad
power to regulate interstate commerce); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606
(1939) (power of Congress to regulate is plenary and expansive).
50. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated by 352 U.S. 350 (1952).
51. See BARTLEY, supra note 46, at 28-30; Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance—the
Rhetoric and the Reality, 27 N.M. L. REV. 167, 196 (1997).
52. The Constitution and the Supreme Court: The Annual Address by the Honorable Strom
Thurmond, in VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 219 (1955), microformed on Reel 9,
BA.V57 (on file with University of Virginia School of Law).
53. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 231-38 (1993).
54. See id. at 234-35.
55. See BARTLEY, supra note 46, at 85-86; see also id. at 89. For Brady’s role in inspiring
the Citizens’ Councils, see MCMILLEN, supra note 46. For Brady’s opinion that Brown was the
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[S]ince 1937 the Supreme Court has overruled 33 earlier decisions. This is by
the count of one of the Justices. Those decisions were the settled law of the
land; decisions on which rights were vested; decisions on which the people of
this country had the right to rely. This record is unprecedented in our history.
In the 135 years prior to 1937 only 29 cases were overruled, compared to 33
cases in 16 years. Such a record obviously reveals an irresponsible Court. I
think it shows an incompetent Court. Such a record shows that the Court
legislates, and is constantly grasping additional power.56

Eastland’s assertion that the Supreme Court had, for seventeen years, been
on a bid for increased power was not entirely untrue. In fact, since 1937, that
Court had followed an increasingly interventionary path. One field in which it
did this was African-American civil rights. In 1938, the Court decided
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, a ruling that marked a sea-change in
judicial attitudes toward blacks by asserting that African-Americans were
entitled to equal education within their own states and could not be required to
go to other states to enroll in graduate or professional school.57 In 1944, the
Court followed Gaines with a ruling agreeing to strike down the white primary,
a mechanism designed to prevent blacks from voting in primary elections.58 In
1950, the NAACP achieved its greatest victory yet when the Supreme Court
ruled that graduate education could no longer be segregated.59
By 1954, many white southerners realized that the tide of Supreme Court
jurisprudence was washing against them. This became evident in a report
written by Alabama’s Legislative Reference Service in January of 1954, four
months before Brown was released. According to the report, five southern
states had passed legislation to deal with a negative ruling in Brown long
before May 17, 1954.60 South Carolina and Virginia both passed measures to
deal with a desegregation ruling in 1952; Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama
passed similar measures in 1953.61 Contrary to popular belief, Brown was no
shocker: “Majority opinion,” asserted the Alabama commission in January of
1954, “predicts that the Court will repudiate the ‘separate but equal’
doctrine.”62
Part of the reason that southern states suspected Brown might be coming
was that they saw it within the context of other cases, all encroaching on states’

culmination of a trend in jurisprudence that began under Roosevelt, see TOM P. BRADY, BLACK
MONDAY (Citizens’ Council Press 1955).
56. 100 CONG. REC. 6,7254 (1954) (statement of Sen. Eastland).
57. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
58. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).
59. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 634, 635-36 (1950).
60. AL. LEG. REF. SERV., THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION PROBLEM 3-5 (January 9, 1954)
(report to the Legislative Council of Alabama).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 4-5.
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rights. An example of this emerged in 1956, when ninety-six southern
congressmen, an overwhelming majority of the southern Representatives and
Senators in Washington, signed a declaration of opposition to the Supreme
Court.63 The document, known popularly as the Southern Manifesto, vowed to
use legal means to subvert Brown, which it framed not as an isolated opinion
but as the culmination of “a trend in the federal judiciary undertaking to
legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress.”64 This applied not
simply to civil rights cases, but to other cases as well—criminal procedure and
labor cases among them. Oft-cited examples included Griffin v. Illinois, a case
releasing an accused criminal from jail because of the failure to provide him
with a transcript of his trial proceedings65 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, a case
nullifying all state laws against treason and sedition,66 among others. Civil
rights cases that did not bode well for the South included Mitchell v. United
States,67 Morgan v. Virginia,68 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,69
Henderson v. United States,70 Shelley v. Kraemer,71 and Hurd v. Hodge.72
Southern tendencies to view Brown as part of a jurisprudential trend help
explain attempts to shore up the southern legal system during the Second
Reconstruction. Not only were southern lawyers and judges afraid of NAACP
lawyers, but they feared a larger move by the federal judiciary to limit their
autonomy and reduce their power. By raising the bar to the practice of law, not
to mention increasing the qualifications and regulations placed on state judges,
the South sought to counter federal encroachment with heightened

63. Text of Manifesto by 96 Southerners, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 12, 1956, also
printed in 102 CONG. REC. 4,4515-16 (1956) (statement of Rep. Smith).
64. Id.
65. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
66. 350 U.S. 497, 510 (1956); see Constitutional Law: Impeachment—Georgia, 2 RACE
REL. L. REP. 485, 489 (1957).
67. 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 guaranteed “a
fundamental right of equality of treatment” on trains).
68. 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (holding a Virginia statute requiring segregation on motor
vehicle carriers unconstitutional).
69. 333 U.S. 28, 40 (1948) (holding the exclusion of African-Americans from an amusement
park outside of Detroit unconstitutional).
70. 339 U.S. 816, 825-26 (1950) (holding that segregation on private dining cars violated
Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act).
71. 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (holding racial covenants unconstitutional).
72. 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948) (holding racial covenants unenforceable in federal court).
Florida also cited a string of cases on which to base its interposition resolution against Brown:
[T]he Legislature of Florida denies that the Supreme Court of the United States had the
right which it asserted in the school cases decided by it on May 17, 1954, the labor union
case decided on May 21, 1956, the cases relating to criminal proceedings decided on April
23, 1956, and January 16, 1956, the anti-sedition case decided on April 2, 1956, and the
case relating to teacher requirements decided on April 9, 1956.
H.R. Con. Res. 174, 1957 Leg. (Fla. 1957), reprinted in 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 707, 708 (1957).
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requirements on who could bring cases and on how those cases would be both
pled and ultimately decided. Professionalism emerged as a counterpoint to the
informal, collegial manner in which judges were selected and cases decided.
In addition to bringing power out of the hands of backward-looking agrarian
elites, this helped salvage the reputation of the law in the South, even as it
made it increasingly difficult for black lawyers to win victories in the courts.
In the next section, we will see how this bore implications for the trajectory of
the civil rights movement, even as it inspired transformations of the judicial
apparatus in progressive, moderate North Carolina.
III. RAISING THE BAR IN THE TARHEEL STATE
On May 17, 1957, exactly three years after the Supreme Court handed
down its ruling in Brown, North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges introduced
a bill in the state legislature outlawing barratry. According to the Raleigh
News & Observer, the bill “which would stop lawyers and organizations from
‘stirring up’ litigation, is an invocation of an ancient doctrine to deal with
today’s most modern problem.”73 That problem was desegregation. The News
& Observer asserted that:
Originally the term meant the sale of church and state offices. . . . The
interpretation put on the doctrine under the bill introduced yesterday is a
somewhat new one, now being considered by most Southern states, in an effort
to stop the NAACP from paying for litigation costs of plaintiffs in civil rights
suits.74

The bill, which disbarred any attorney and de-chartered any corporation
“not actually a party to court cases” that tried to “appeal in or pay for legal
actions” coincided with a second measure, also designed to cripple the
NAACP, requiring corporations “engaged in ‘the advancement’ of people on
the basis of color, race and religion to fil[e] financial information and
membership lists” with the secretary of state.75 As in South Carolina, these
measures placed severe roadblocks in the way of African-Americans trying to
use the courts as a means of advancing their interests. And yet, Kelly M.
Alexander, President of the North Carolina NAACP, warned that the bills
would not put an end to the “clamor for equality” in the state.76 In fact,
73. Under the Dome, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 17, 1957.
74. Id.
75. ‘Barratry’ Bill is Reported Favorably by House Group, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 1, 1957; Ray Parker, Jr., NAACP Head Says Bill Won’t Stop ‘Clamor for Equality’,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 29, 1957.
76. Parker, supra note 75. Representative Frank Snepp of Mecklenburg opposed the bills on
the grounds that they would only encourage racial strife by inviting recriminations against blacks
belonging to the NAACP. Requiring membership lists, contested Snepp, might “set the stage of
racial strife” because “Negroes joining the NAACP will lose their jobs.” House Passes AntiNAACP Measure, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 6, 1957.
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asserted Alexander, if the NAACP “were injured” by the laws, then the black
struggle would be pressured to articulate itself in new ways, a warning that
foreshadowed the movement’s turn from the courts to the lunch counters in
1960.77 According to Alexander, even if the NAACP was damaged, “the
Negroes of North Carolina will continue to feel about segregation as they have
up to this time[;] . . . the opposition might take a different form, but it would
continue as vigorously as before.”78
Alexander’s words, like Cassandra’s, fell on deaf ears. Instead, Hodges
gambled that, by raising the bar to the practice of law, he would be able to
neutralize black activism and quell racial unrest in the state. He also hoped
that raising the bar would thwart white extremists. Hodges’s Assistant
Attorney General, Robert Giles, articulated this when he asserted that the bills
were necessary because “organizations ‘on both sides’ of the race question
‘have mushroomed’ and ‘collected a great deal of money.’”79 “The bill would
apply,” affirmed Giles, “to the NAACP, the Ku Klux Klan and to the Patriots,
Inc., [an] extreme pro-segregation organization.”80
The move to neutralize radical groups by raising the ethical bar to the
practice of law coincided with a larger statewide emphasis on revamping the
judiciary. At the North Carolina Bar Association’s annual meeting in 1956,
Governor Hodges requested that the Bar establish a special committee to
investigate the court system and recommend ways of improving its
efficiency.81 In its defense, Hodges lamented “the extent to which at least
some of the general public has lost its respect for the courts of our State as
institutions capable of rendering swift and inexpensive justice to the rich and
poor alike.”82 Hodges’s allusion to the swiftness of the state’s justice system
referred obliquely to a backlog of cases in North Carolina’s courts that had
plagued the system for years, even at the local level. His reference to rich and
poor marked a more complex problem, one that related in certain profound
ways to the state’s struggle regarding civil rights.
During the 1950s, North Carolina adjudicated the vast majority of its civil
and criminal cases in police courts, or “poor man’s courts,” operated by
locally-elected justices of the peace.83 These courts were informal, often held

77. Parker, supra note 75. For the definitive work on the Greensboro sit-ins, see WILLIAM
H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1980).
78. Parker, supra note 75.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Governor Luther Hodges’ Address, BAR NOTES (N.C. Bar Ass’n), July 1956, at 23.
82. Id.
83. See INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, THE THIRD LOOK:
A REVIEW OF THE STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE N.C. BAR ASSOCIATION
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in unconventional settings like storefronts or fairgrounds, and were notorious
for being corrupt.84 Much of this corruption stemmed from the fact that
justices of the peace, or JPs as they were popularly known, were paid based on
the number of convictions that they secured.85 This fee system helped
transform JP courts into engines of repression that operated disproportionately
against the poor, both white and black, thereby compromising the authority of
the legal system as a whole.86 “Many local governing bodies look upon the
police courts,” asserted Hodges in 1956, “primarily as a source of income
rather than a place for the dispensation of justice. Of course, you and all the
rest of the State are familiar with the picture presented by our system of
Justices of the Peace and the antiquated and much-complained of fee
system.”87 The governor continued, emphasizing the importance of improving
the efficiency of the court system: “We must continue to improve both the
efficiency and speed with which litigation is handled in our Superior Courts if
our courts are to regain the place of respect that they once held in the public’s
esteem.”88
Hodges’s interest in the public’s esteem of the courts prefigured his move,
one year later, to limit the number of NAACP lawyers in the state. Both
initiatives sought to bolster the authority of the state, and in particular the law,
at a moment when that authority was under attack. After all, 1956 was the
height of massive resistance to Brown, a political movement that defied both
the Supreme Court and to a certain extent, the law in general, just as it was a
year of black, NAACP sponsored challenges to the southern legal order.
Hodges’s focus on cleaning up the state’s criminal system provided one way of
shoring up the judicial apparatus without inflaming racial tensions, as did his
subversion of the NAACP. Both measures sought to neutralize destabilizing
forces, whether they be judicial corruption or civil rights activism.
Hodges’s decision to use the state bar association, rather than an executive
or legislative committee to investigate the state’s judicial apparatus
complemented his strategy of managing the integration crisis peacefully.
Because it was a private organization, the bar appeared apolitical. And,
because it was an organization dedicated to improving the quality and integrity
of the law, it provided a modality for advancing political agendas under the
guise of doing nothing more than raising standards and increasing efficiency.
This was particularly important for Hodges’s plan to clean up the police courts.
After all, the JP system was a pillar of North Carolina’s decentralized power
COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING AND EXPEDITING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORTH
CAROLINA 9 (1958) [hereinafter THIRD LOOK].
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Governor Luther Hodges’ Address, supra note 81, at 23.
88. Id. at 24.
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structure, an arrangement favored by rural, often heavily black counties. These
counties objected to any form of centralization, fearing that it would shift the
nexus of power out of their hands and into the clutches of bureaucratic elites in
Raleigh. And yet, Luther Hodges, a businessman and a moderate, had little
patience for the often flagrant abuses of judicial authority that characterized the
periphery’s treatment of the poor, particularly blacks. The state bar provided
an ideal modality for policing the administration of justice at the local level by
enabling Hodges to veil the centralization of the judiciary, not in terms of
reducing peripheral power, but in terms of improving the efficiency and equity
of the courts. The bar also provided an ideal modality for raising standards to
both the admission and practice of law, a measure that made it an effective
weapon against the NAACP and a consequent line of defense against
increasingly aggressive black demands for civil rights. Of course, Hodges
never overtly identified the bar as a line of defense against social change.
Instead, he liked to claim that the judiciary hovered “above politics,” like an
angel.89
Others were not as diplomatic. In fact, in 1957, the president of North
Carolina’s Bar Association, W.W. Taylor, Jr., openly confirmed the utility of
the bar as a modality for thwarting black civil rights. “For a long time,”
announced Taylor, “most of us, as individuals, have been deeply concerned
with the increasing usurpation by the Federal Government of powers
traditionally reserved to the states, and, with such usurpation, the inevitable
destruction of the constitutional rights of the states and of the individual
citizens. Taylor continued, leveling his critique at civil rights, and stated:
The legislative action culminating in the Civil Rights Bill [of 1957], the
executive action at Little Rock, and many startling decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in the past few years . . . have brought into clearer focus
the drastic changes that are being wrought in our basic governmental structure
by all three branches of the Federal Government.
There is, in my opinion, only one force in the entire country that can arrest
the present trends of the Federal Government, and that force is the organized
bar of this nation.90

Taylor’s claim that the organized bar provided a line of defense against
civil rights illustrates an awareness on his part of the bar’s political utility in
the struggle against Brown. Further, it recontextualizes Luther Hodges’s
endorsement of the bar as an apolitical apparatus, suggesting instead that it was
89. As Hodges wrote in his memoir, Businessman in the Statehouse, “I was especially
careful about getting only the finest men for the judiciary. I knew that this branch of the
government should be above politics.” LUTHER H. HODGES, BUSINESSMAN IN THE STATEHOUSE:
SIX YEARS AS GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA 153 (1962).
90. W.W. Taylor, Jr., The President’s Page, BAR NOTES (N.C. Bar Ass’n), Nov. 1957, at 1314.
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an ideal political device, particularly for shoring up a teetering legal system.
As we have seen, the bar’s ability to facilitate political reconfigurations from
behind the rhetoric of improving efficiency and standards provided an arsenal
of possibilities for a governor trying to preserve order and build a barricade
against encroachments by the federal government onto state law. Restrictions
on barratry constituted one such barricade. The bar’s role as an investigatory
agency constituted another. In North Carolina, the investigatory powers of the
Bar enabled it to play an integral part in the dismantling of the police court
system. Although seemingly unrelated to race, this helped the cause of
moderation in the state, both by improving the fairness of the law and by
removing power from peripheral counties. Peripheral counties, particularly
eastern former plantation counties with high black populations, consistently
lobbied for overt defiance of the Court, not to mention massive resistance.
Metropolitan counties like Mecklenburg, the home of Charlotte, and Orange,
the home of Chapel Hill, struggled to promote more subtle strategies—zoning,
re-districting, and token integration among them. Luther Hodges, a business
moderate more concerned with attracting outside industry than bolstering the
power of rural elites, pursued such strategies, disparaging massive resistance in
the process.91
Consequently, Hodges’s decision to use the state bar as a means of
centralizing the judiciary, improving the image of the law, and disempowering
peripheral elites coincided with his larger response to Brown, which sought to
maintain a curtain of civility around race relations in the state, avoid unwanted
media attention from the outside, and allow administrative elites in Raleigh
enough time to reconfigure segregation along facially neutral lines.
To head the Bar Committee on Improving and Expediting the
Administration of Justice, as Hodges’s committee came to be called, the
governor selected J. Spencer Bell, a state senator from, not surprisingly,
Charlotte, the seat of Mecklenburg County. Behind Hodges’s decision to
appoint Bell—and behind him, the bar as a quasi-investigatory arm of the
state—lurked a not-so-subtle attempt to wrest control of the judiciary from the
legislature that had itself, because of a disproportionate allotment of electoral
power written into the state constitution following the Civil War, come under
the sway of rural plantation counties. “I would like now to state why we chose
the North Carolina Bar Association as the agency which would best serve the
purpose we had in mind,” announced Hodges. “First, you are not a taxsupported or an official agency of the State; and therefore, in investigating a
department of the State, you should not only be free from any political pressure

91. For more on Hodges’s moderate brand of resistance, see BARTLEY, supra note 46, at
213-20, and TIMOTHY TYSON, RADIO FREE DIXIE: ROBERT F. WILLIAMS AND THE ROOTS OF
BLACK POWER 104-08 (1999).
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in fact, but also free from any charges of political pressure.”92 That the bar
was not politically motivated was, of course, untrue, and yet Hodges realized
that, because it was an independent organization dedicated to improving the
standards of both the bench and bar, it possessed a certain meta-political aura,
not to mention an interest in ridding the legal profession of elected, untrained
officials.
A.

The Bell Committee Report

The Bell Committee, as Hodges’s bar committee came to be known,
documented a parade of horribles besmirching North Carolina’s judicial
system.93 Justices of the peace, not surprisingly, led the procession. Elected
by local constituencies, they operated outside the purview of state appellate
courts and yet handled the vast majority of the state’s criminal matters.94
According to the Committee’s final report, the JP system was rigged to
produce convictions, whether the accused was guilty or not. A summary of the
report drafted by University of North Carolina’s Institute of Government
asserted that:
From its beginning, [the justice of the peace] system has been haunted with the
tragic flaw that compensation to the Justice of the Peace in criminal cases
never comes when the person accused is acquitted, and many people feel that
this fact tends to weight the scales of justice in favor of conviction and against
acquittal, and waters down the force of the criminal law tradition giving to
every person charged with crime the benefit of every reasonable doubt.95

Such a system begged for federal intervention, even as it legitimated black
claims that state law in the South was corrupt. To make matters worse, many
JPs did not work full time, but rather operated as “birds on the wing” with no
fixed time or place to conduct judicial business.96 According to the Bar
Committee’s report:
[T]he part-time justice of the peace tends to business any time or anywhere and
the records show him trying cases in his own back yard, on his front porch, in
the rear end of a grocery store over chicken crates, over a meat counter in a
butcher shop, in an automobile, over the plow handles, in a printshop, in a
garage, in an icehouse, in a fairground ticket booth, and in a funeral parlor.97

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Governor Luther Hodges’ Address, supra note 81, at 24.
See THIRD LOOK, supra note 83, at 9.
See id. at 6-7.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
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William Faulkner could not have devised a more grotesque mechanism for
administering criminal justice. According to Spencer Bell, the system
engendered “too much disrespect for [the judiciary] to be tolerated.”98
Consequently, Bell’s Committee recommended that fees be fixed, that JPs
be brought under the umbrella of the state court system and reconfigured as
permanent district courts where their decisions could be appealed, and that
they be subjected to an intensive selection process.99 This marked a profound
shift in what was popularly known in North Carolina as “the poor man’s
court.”100 The recommendations were a far cry from the complete lack of
eligibility requirements imposed on JPs in the past.101 In their place would
emerge district courts, from which appeals could be made to the state supreme
court.102 The recommendation promised to effect major change, not least of
which by reorganizing and policing the state’s fourteen hundred-plus lower
courts that had operated for years as independent units without centralized
supervision or guidance.103
The method of selecting lower court judges was also a major shift.104 It
involved the establishment of judicial screening commissions that would be set
up around the state and be held responsible for making nominations to fill
judicial vacancies.105 “The Committee concluded that the administration of
justice [was a topic] of statewide import rather than a purely local matter, and
that the officers who dispense[d] justice should not be selected on a local basis,
or by ordinary political methods.”106 The stated motivation behind these
changes was, of course, to improve the caliber of judicial appointments.107 The
effective result, although judicial quality did improve, was to remove the
power to appoint judges from local political elites and place it instead into the
hands of the state supreme court.108 In fact, the Bell Committee recommended
that the state Supreme Court make all final appointments after reviewing
screened applicants:
The Committee’s solution is to have the Chief Justice make the appointments,
from nominations submitted by the resident regular Superior Court judge. The
Committee feels that this method should result in a more nearly uniform

98. Three Points Hit Jaypee System, RALEIGH TIMES, Oct. 22, 1958.
99. Ann Sawyer, New Pattern For The Crazy Quilt: What Can Bell Report Do For Our
Lower Courts?, CHARLOTTE NEWS, Nov. 25, 1958.
100. North Carolina’s Vote, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 1958.
101. Three Points Hit Jaypee System, supra note 98.
102. Sawyer, supra note 99.
103. Pat Reese, What Changes Proposed?, FAYETTEVILE OBSERVER, Dec. 14, 1958.
104. Id.
105. The Governor Needs No Screen, GREENSBORO DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 1958.
106. THIRD LOOK, supra note 83, at 52.
107. The Governor Needs No Screen, supra note 105.
108. Id.
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quality of local judges over the state, and that appointment by the highest
judicial officer of the State will give to the local office a desirable dignity and
significance.109

“We have been extremely fortunate in North Carolina in having an honest
and reasonably able judiciary,” announced Spencer Bell in 1958, referring to
the Democratic party’s de facto one-party rule over the state.110 He continued:
“I believe, in spite of the fact that our judges must run on a partisan party
ticket[,] . . . we are fast becoming industrialized and the picture can change. If
we had an effective two party system[,] our judges would have to become
active party politicians.”111
Bell’s allusion to industrialization referred to the increasing numbers of
voters in urban, cosmopolitan counties, like his home county of Mecklenburg.
These counties were chafing under the control of rural elites and, like Bell,
wanted to withdraw power from the periphery. That judges had been honest
and reasonable in the past was irrelevant, a bone thrown by Bell to rural
judiciaries who, if anything, had compromised the integrity of the law through
lapses in professionalism and ability. And yet, such flattery helped Bell make
it seem as if court restructuring would help rural counties by insulating them
from the increasing electoral power of metropolitan areas, even if the opposite
was in fact true.
Not only did the Bell Committee suggest that the state supreme court make
all judicial appointments, but it advised that the court also be empowered to
write all procedural rules.112 This expanded the court’s rule-making power
from those rules that applied only to itself, to those previously written by the
legislature governing trial courts.113 To augment this increase in the court’s
power, the judiciary sought to make good on its promise of improving the
image of the law, not simply by effecting substantive changes in the structure
of North Carolina’s court system, but by requiring judges to don robes. Before
January 1, 1958, superior court judges were not required to wear the black
vestments. “On January 1, 1958,” noted Bar President W.W. Taylor, “the
Superior Court judges, in accordance with the request originating in a
resolution adopted by this Association at its 1956 Convention, donned judicial
robes.”114
The donning of robes, like the centralization of judicial power, sought not
simply to improve the efficiency of the judicial apparatus, but the image of the
109. THIRD LOOK, supra note 83, at 52.
110. Spencer Bell, Speech to Governor and Chief Justice, at 4 (1958) (on file with North
Carolina Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, N.C., Governor’s Papers, Luther Hodges
Papers, Box 294, “Judicial Committee on Improving Justice” Folder).
111. Id.
112. THIRD LOOK, supra note 83, at 59.
113. Id.
114. W.W. Taylor, The President’s Page, BAR NOTES (N.C. Bar Ass’n), Feb. 1958, at 20.
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law. As in South Carolina, lawyers in North Carolina exhibited an acute
concern for the way in which their profession was viewed in the wake of
Brown. Bell announced in 1958:
There never was a time in the history of the world when the democracies
needed to keep their fences mended more than they do today. Respect for the
judicial branch of our government is the bed rock necessity if a government of
laws and not of men is to prevail.115

Bell’s penchant for a government of law coincided nicely with his desire to
increase the autonomy and power of lawyers. “Reform is coming,” announced
Bell in 1958: “[T]he question is not whether to reform[,] but [w]ho is going to
do the reforming—the Bench and the Bar[,] or the people?”116 As in South
Carolina, fear of the democratic process catalyzed efforts to place the power to
regulate lawyers in the hands of the state bar and state supreme court. This
coincided with efforts to remove control of the judiciary from rural elites,
improve the image of the law in general and, with restrictions on barratry,
barricade the gates of justice from blacks, whether they be NAACP lawyers or
newly enfranchised voters.
B.

Responses to the Bell Committee Report

Upon its release, the Bell Committee Report attracted considerable praise,
particularly among lawyers and superior court judges from urban centers and
heavily white, western counties. According to Braxton Craven of Morganton,
located in the western Piedmont portion of the state, “he had failed to find ‘a
single rotten brick’” in the proposal, “and favored their passage ‘with every “I”
dotted and every “t” crossed.’”117 Judge J. Will Pless, Jr. of neighboring
Marion agreed, asserting that appointment “would free judges from political
obligations which might hamper their administration of justice.”118 Luther
Hodges also agreed. On September 4, 1958, the Governor wrote:
The North Carolina Bar Association study committee, under the leadership of
Senator J. Spencer Bell of Charlotte has worked diligently and devotedly for
the past two and one-half years in studying the operation of our courts and in
formulating proposals for their improvement. I have said previously that the
proposals of this study committee seem to me to be sound in principle and
merit our very careful consideration.119

Even African-Americans approved of the Bell Report. In fact, according
to Dr. John R. Larkins, the one black member of Luther Hodges’s Court
115.
116.
117.
1959.
118.
119.

Bell, supra note 110, at 6.
Id.
Bell Court Plan Gets Support From Judges, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 2,
Id.
Luther Hodges, Introduction to THIRD LOOK, supra note 83.
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Improvement Committee, “All of the individuals and groups with whom I have
discussed the recommendations to improve courts have indicated an interest
and expressed a desire to contribute to the improvement of the administration
of justice.”120 Of course, Larkins spoke primarily to conservative black
organizations, groups that were unlikely to support radical initiatives in the
first place. These included the Northeast District Schoolmasters Club and
Coastal Plain District of North Carolina Teachers Association, both of whom
relied on the existence and perpetuation of separate black schools.121
Despite considerable support, not everyone endorsed Bell’s
recommendations. Many charged that the plan would place too much power in
the hands of the state supreme court.122 This was a matter of particular concern
to rural elites in the heavily black, eastern portion of the state who not only
dominated the state legislature, but also enjoyed having a lower court system
free from centralized oversight and control. According to Judge Henry
Stevens of rural Warsaw, in the eastern county of Duplin, “Centralizing the
judiciary in Raleigh would be a catastrophe . . . I believe all judges should be
elected . . . [I] see no reason for bothering a system that for nearly 100 years
has been unimpeachable.”123 Clawson Williams, a thirty-five year veteran of
the superior court bench from Sanford, south of Chapel Hill, agreed. “I don’t
want anyone to ride herd on the judiciary,” he announced: “[T]he
concentration of tremendous power in the Supreme Court . . . is the beginning
of tyranny . . . [T]he people should not be deprived of their right to elect
judges.”124
Perhaps most vocal of the opponents to the Bell plan was a superior court
judge named Frank M. Armstrong who charged that the suggestions were
tailored to appease the North. Armstrong even asserted at one point “that he
and other attorneys and judges were ‘sick and tired of people from up North,
these law professors and theorists from without, suggesting such changes.’”125
The allegation was, on its face, absurd. And yet, it revealed the extent to
which court reform bled into other tensions, among them the rural-based fear
that centralization coincided with northern domination of the South.
As lawyers and judges debated the Bell plan around the state, the 1959
legislative session began, leading immediately to withering fire from rural state
legislators. A constitutional study group sponsored by the legislature
challenged the Bell Committee’s proposal that the state supreme court be
120. In Negro Campaign Bell Plan Being Boosted, GREENSBORO REC., Nov. 19, 1958.
121. Id.
122. Bell Fires Back at Critics of Plan to Reform N.C.’s Court Machinery, WINSTON-SALEM
J., Dec. 18, 1958.
123. Court Bills Are Rapped by 2 Judges, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 25, 1959
(alterations in original).
124. Id. (alterations in original).
125. What Carpetbagger?, WINSTON-SALEM J., Oct. 31, 1958.
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granted rule-making power over the judiciary.126 The legislature also opposed
the appointment of state judges, preferring that they remain elected.127
Particularly devastating was a move led by John Kerr of rural Warren County
to torpedo the plan in the state’s House of Representatives. Kerr, with the help
of fellow lawmakers, tacked a measure onto the bill that would have required
placing a limit on the number of senators in the legislature to one per county,
thereby ensuring rural hegemony in the state.128 This measure, designed to
counteract the move to disempower the rural periphery that lay at the heart of
court reform, was torpedoed by populous metropolitan counties in the House,
thereby sealing the fate of Bell’s proposals in 1959.129
When the state legislature reconvened in 1961, Bell’s plan received a
second hearing.130 Over the complaints of critics like Judge Frank M.
Armstrong, who accused Bell’s court reforms of “setting up machinery for a
‘potential judicial dictatorship,’” the Committee’s proposals passed.131 North
Carolina Bar Association President James B. McMillan celebrated the victory.
“Passage of the Court Bill is probably the most significant development in the
legal profession in our generation,” he asserted in a message to the state bar
association in May of 1961.132 Two months later, he alluded specifically to the
impact that the bill would have on civil rights through, of all things, its
reformation of the police courts. He stated:
It is in the criminal courts and especially in the courts most inferior in
jurisdiction and competence that the Constitution is interpreted daily and that
the Bill of Rights is daily honored or abused and that the public at large and the
individual voter and client get their every day interpretations of liberty and
Constitution as the lawyers and judges see them.133

McMillan’s message was clear. By cleaning up North Carolina’s criminal
system, the Bar improved its credibility in the field of civil rights. Without, of
course, having to actually make concessions to the civil rights movement, it
turned away from the courts and towards the lunch counters and the streets.

126. See Under the Dome, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 14, 1959.
127. See Plan to Appoint Judges Opposed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 1, 1959.
128. Roy Parker, Jr., Senate Votes for Court Reform, 40–7: One Senator Amendment Is
Approved, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 5, 1959.
129. See Charles Clay, House Torpedoes Court Reform, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
June 17, 1959.
130. 1961 Annual Meeting Report, BAR NOTES (N.C. Bar Ass’n), July 1961, at 5.
131. Court Plan Denounced by Judge, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 1, 1961.
The final passage of Bell’s court reform proposals are discussed in the North Carolina Bar
Association’s 1961 Annual Meeting Report. See 1961 Annual Meeting Report, supra note 130, at
5.
132. James McMillan, President’s Message, BAR NOTES (N.C. Bar Ass’n), May 1961, at 17.
133. 1961 Annual Meeting Report, supra note 130, at 7.
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Simon E. Sobeloff, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
articulated other ways in which the court reforms might benefit North
Carolina’s position regarding civil rights. “In the past several years,”
announced the Judge, “in a growing number of cases persons convicted of state
offenses have resorted to the federal courts claiming that they had been denied
their federal constitutional rights in the state proceedings.”134 This led to a
hemorrhage of state power to the federal bench, one that could be stemmed “if
state courts were to grant hearings to resolve allegations of denial of
constitutional rights.”135 By paying more attention to civil rights claims at the
state level, even rights that had little to do with integration, Sobeloff suggested,
southern state courts could bolster their autonomy and power, thereby
compensating for southern failures to uphold civil rights in other arenas.136
Judge Sobeloff’s recommendations, not to mention those set forth in
Spencer Bell’s report, would finally be enacted four years after the court bill
passed in 1965, when the state constitution was amended.137 It was the third
time in North Carolina history that the constitution had been re-examined.138
The first was in 1776, in conjunction with the founding, the second in 1868,
following the Civil War and the end of slavery, and the third in 1965,
following the Second Reconstruction and Brown.139
IV. CONCLUSION
Brown catalyzed transformations in the southern judiciary, even as it
sounded the death knell of Jim Crow. These transformations occurred in
conservative states such as South Carolina and moderate progressive states
such as North Carolina. They included measures aimed directly at the
NAACP, like restrictions on barratry, as well as more substantive shifts in the
configuration of power, away from rural peripheral counties toward the
metrapole, and away from the legislature toward state supreme courts.
These reconfigurations provide insight not simply into the rise of
resistance to integration in the South, but the survival of the southern state. As
southern leaders struggled to deal with Brown directly, so too did they seek to
bolster the state apparatus, particularly mechanisms within that apparatus that
presented the risk of further heightening popular discontent. This discontent
included anger, not only at Jim Crow by blacks or Brown by whites, but at
corrupt, inefficient, unjust criminal courts.
134. Address of Honorable Simon E. Sobeloff, in 1961 Annual Meeting Report, supra note
130, at 19.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Charles Craven, State’s Courts Undergo Third Reform, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), May 16, 1965.
138. See id.
139. Id.
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Southern state bar associations acted as key architects in the clean-up of
these courts, not to mention transformations in the southern judiciary in
general. Bar leaders realized that building integrity and respect for the law
provided convenient rationales for centralizing authority and removing power
from peripheral elites, both factors that facilitated moderate political strategies
of resistance to Brown. Able to recommend substantive reconfigurations of
power under the rubric of promoting professionalism and respect for the law,
the bar provided an ideal modality for removing power from the periphery,
increasing the regulation of lawyers, centralizing authority around the state
supreme court, and eliminating corruption.
Not all of these changes hurt blacks, nor were they caused solely by
Brown. On the contrary, the centralization of the judiciary did a great deal to
raise the professionalism and uniformity of southern courts—a measure that
helped all southerners, black and white. Further, many southern lawyers
viewed Brown as part of a larger trend of federal encroachment onto states’
rights—a trend that inspired southern strategists to circle the wagons by
removing power from peripheral elites, cleaning up the administration of
justice, and raising the ethical standards of the practice of law. Beginning in
the 1930s, it is important to remember, the winds of Supreme Court
jurisprudence had shifted increasingly against the South, particularly at the
national level. By centralizing judicial authority, increasing the regulation of
lawyers, and removing regulatory authority from the legislative branch,
southern states created a monopoly around the law, insulating it from the
vagaries of the electoral process, improving the quality of judicial opinionmaking, and reducing the pool of applicants capable of entering the judicial
apparatus.
All of these developments might have occurred without
desegregation, and indeed did occur without desegregation in states outside of
the South. And yet, it is the way in which these shifts complemented racial
strategies that provides clues into the political nature of state formation in the
region. This, at the end of the day, is the lesson to be learned from Brown’s
role in transforming the southern judiciary.

